

Online Appendix

Error Prone Inference from Response Time: The Case of Intuitive Generosity in Public-Good Games

By: María P. Recalde, Arno Riedl, and Lise Vesterlund

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A. Instructions

A.1 Public good games with interior equilibria

Instructions

This is an experiment on decision making. The earnings you receive today will depend on the decisions made by you and by other participants in this room. Please do not talk or communicate with others in any way. If you have a question please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to where you are sitting to answer you in private.

Earnings

There will be two parts of the experiment. Only one of the two parts will count for payment. Once part 1 and 2 are completed we will flip a coin to determine which part counts for payment. Your earnings in the experiment will be the sum of a \$6 payment for showing up on time and your earnings from either part 1 or part 2. We will first explain how earnings are determined in part 1. Once part 1 is completed we will explain how earnings in part 2 are determined. Decisions in part 1 only affect possible earnings in part 1, and decisions in part 2 only affect possible earnings in part 2. Your total earnings will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the experiment.

Part 1

In part 1 you will be matched in groups of four. That is the computer will randomly match you with three other participants.

You will each have to make one decision, and earnings will depend on the decision made by you and the decisions made by other members of your group. Neither during nor after the experiment will you get to know who the other members of your group are or what decisions they make. Likewise, no one in your group will know who you are and what decision you make.

You and each of the other group members will be given \$10 and asked to make an investment decision. You may select to invest any dollar amount between \$0 and \$10 in a group account. Investments in the group account affect both your earnings and those of the other members of the group. That is, individual earnings depend on the individual investment in the group account and the investment by the other group members.

Decision Screen

Your investment decision will be made using a decision screen. You make a decision by entering the number of dollars you wish to invest in the group account in the area labeled: *Dollars to invest in group account*. Once you have made your investment decision, please click the red *Finalize Decision* button. You will not be able to modify your decision once your choice is finalized.

A decision screen is shown below. The actual decision screen will include a payoff table with the earnings that result from the investments made by you and the three other group members. We will use the screenshot below to demonstrate how to read the table. The first column shows all possible investments by you. The first row shows all possible average investments by the other group members. If the average investment by the other group members is say \$2, then it may result from each investing \$2, or from one member investing \$0, another investing \$2, and a third investing \$4.

Decision Screen

Dollars to invest in group account Finalize Decision

Average investment made by the other group members

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Your investment	0	\$A00 \$B00	\$A01 \$B01	\$A02 \$B02	\$A03 \$B03	\$A04 \$B04	\$A05 \$B05	\$A06 \$B06	\$A07 \$B07	\$A08 \$B08	\$A09 \$B09	\$A10 \$B10
	1	\$A10 \$B10	\$A11 \$B11	\$A12 \$B12	\$A13 \$B13	\$A14 \$B14	\$A15 \$B15	\$A16 \$B16	\$A17 \$B17	\$A18 \$B18	\$A19 \$B19	\$A110 \$B110
	2	\$A20 \$B20	\$A21 \$B21	\$A22 \$B22	\$A23 \$B23	\$A24 \$B24	\$A25 \$B25	\$A26 \$B26	\$A27 \$B27	\$A28 \$B28	\$A29 \$B29	\$A210 \$B210
	3	\$A30 \$B30	\$A31 \$B31	\$A32 \$B32	\$A33 \$B33	\$A34 \$B34	\$A35 \$B35	\$A36 \$B36	\$A37 \$B37	\$A38 \$B38	\$A39 \$B39	\$A310 \$B310
	4	\$A40 \$B40	\$A41 \$B41	\$A42 \$B42	\$A43 \$B43	\$A44 \$B44	\$A45 \$B45	\$A46 \$B46	\$A47 \$B47	\$A48 \$B48	\$A49 \$B49	\$A410 \$B410
	5	\$A50 \$B50	\$A51 \$B51	\$A52 \$B52	\$A53 \$B53	\$A54 \$B54	\$A55 \$B55	\$A56 \$B56	\$A57 \$B57	\$A58 \$B58	\$A59 \$B59	\$A510 \$B510
	6	\$A60 \$B60	\$A61 \$B61	\$A62 \$B62	\$A63 \$B63	\$A64 \$B64	\$A65 \$B65	\$A66 \$B66	\$A67 \$B67	\$A68 \$B68	\$A69 \$B69	\$A610 \$B610
	7	\$A70 \$B70	\$A71 \$B71	\$A72 \$B72	\$A73 \$B73	\$A74 \$B74	\$A75 \$B75	\$A76 \$B76	\$A77 \$B77	\$A78 \$B78	\$A79 \$B79	\$A710 \$B710
	8	\$A80 \$B80	\$A81 \$B81	\$A82 \$B82	\$A83 \$B83	\$A84 \$B84	\$A85 \$B85	\$A86 \$B86	\$A87 \$B87	\$A88 \$B88	\$A89 \$B89	\$A810 \$B810
	9	\$A90 \$B90	\$A91 \$B91	\$A92 \$B92	\$A93 \$B93	\$A94 \$B94	\$A95 \$B95	\$A96 \$B96	\$A97 \$B97	\$A98 \$B98	\$A99 \$B99	\$A910 \$B910
	10	\$A100 \$B100	\$A101 \$B101	\$A102 \$B102	\$A103 \$B103	\$A104 \$B104	\$A105 \$B105	\$A106 \$B106	\$A107 \$B107	\$A108 \$B108	\$A109 \$B109	\$A1010 \$B1010

The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number on the right is the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed.

Each cell reports the payoff you and the other group members receive given your investment and the average investment by the other group members. Your payoff will be depicted in blue and located in the upper left corner of each cell. The average payoff of the other group members will

be depicted in black and located in the bottom right corner of each cell. To determine the payoffs from a specific combination of investments you look at the cell where the row of your investment crosses the column of the average investment by the other group members. In this cell you will see your payoff on the left (in blue) and the average payoff of the other group members on the right (in black). The average payoff for the other group members refers to the payoff they each get when they invest the same amount in the group account.

Consider an example where you invest \$1 and the average investment by the other group members is \$4. Your earnings from this investment decision will be \$A14, where the first number refers to your \$1 investment and the second to the \$4 average investment by the other group members. Similarly the earnings of each of the three other group members will be \$B14. If you were to increase your investment to \$2 you move down one row to see that your earnings would become \$A24 and the average earnings of the other group members would become \$B24. Likewise if the average investment of the other group members increased by \$1, such that you invest \$2 and the other group members on average invest \$5, you move over one column to see that your earnings would become \$A25 and the average payoff to the other group members would be \$B25. Before we begin we will give you a tutorial on how to read the payoff table.

Results Screen

After everyone has made an investment decision you will see a results screen. The results screen will indicate the investments made by you and the other group members and will summarize the earnings you and the other group members receive if part 1 counts for payment. The average earnings for the other group members reported in the payoff table refer to the earnings that result when the three other group members make the same investment decision. In the event that they do not invest the same amount their actual average earnings may differ slightly from that reported in the table. Your own payoff from the listed investment combination will be precisely that listed in the payoff table.

Instructions Part 2

Part 2 is very similar to part 1. [No time pressure or delay: The only difference is that you now must make investment decisions over a sequence of ten rounds.] [Time pressure (and delay): The difference is that you now must make investment decisions over a sequence of ten rounds without a (waiting) time limit.] At the beginning of each round you will be randomly matched with three other people to form a new group of four. You will never be matched with the same three people twice in a row. It is also unlikely that you will meet the same set of three other group members twice. You will not get to know who the other members of your group are nor will you be informed of their past investment. Likewise, no one will know who you are and what investments you made in the past.

Just as for part 1 you will be presented with a decision screen which reports the earnings that you and the other group members get from the different investments. The decision screen will be the same in each round. That is, the earnings are the same for each of the ten rounds and are identical to those seen in part 1.

After each round is complete you will be shown a result screen which reports the investments made by you and the other group members in that round, as well as the earnings you and the other group members made in that round.

If part 2 is selected for payment we will randomly select a number between one and ten. The earnings for the corresponding round will be paid to the participants along with the \$6 show up fee. The part that counts for payment will be determined by the flip of a coin. The round that counts in part 2 will be determined by having a participant draw a number between 1 and 10.

A.2 Public good games with equilibria at the boundary

Instructions

This is an experiment on decision making. The earnings you receive today will depend on the decisions made by you and by other participants in this room. Please do not talk or communicate with others in any way. If you have a question please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to where you are sitting to answer you in private.

Earnings

There will be two parts of the experiment. Only one of the two parts will count for payment. Once part 1 and 2 are completed we will flip a coin to determine which part counts for payment. Your earnings in the experiment will be the sum of a \$6 payment for showing up on time and your earnings from either part 1 or part 2. We will first explain how earnings are determined in part 1. Once part 1 is completed we will explain how earnings in part 2 are determined. Decisions in part 1 only affect possible earnings in part 1, and decisions in part 2 only affect possible earnings in part 2. Your total earnings will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the experiment.

Part 1

In part 1 you will be matched in groups of four. That is, the computer will randomly match you with three other participants.

You will each have to make one decision, and earnings will depend on the decision made by you and the decisions made by other members of your group. Neither during nor after the experiment will you get to know who the other members of your group are or what decisions they make. Likewise, no one in your group will know who you are and what decision you make.

You and each of the other group members will be given \$8 and asked to make an investment decision. You may select to invest any dollar amount between \$0 and \$8 in a group account. Investments in the group account affect both your earnings and those of the other members of the group. That is, individual earnings depend on the individual investment in the group account and the investment by the other group members.

Decision Screen

Your investment decision will be made using a decision screen. You make a decision by entering the number of dollars you wish to invest in the group account in the area labeled: *Dollars to invest in group account*. Once you have made your investment decision, please click the red *Finalize Decision* button. You will not be able to modify your decision once your choice is finalized.

A decision screen is shown below. The actual decision screen will include a description of the earnings you and the other group members receive from investing in the group account. Your total earnings will equal the number of dollars you do not invest in the group account ($\$8 - \text{your investment}$) plus your earnings from investments in the group account. Earnings from the group account depend on the number of dollars you and the three other members of your group invest in the group account.

Decision Screen

Part 1

You have been given \$8 and may select to invest any dollar amount between \$0 and \$8 in a group account. Your total earnings will equal the number of dollars you do not invest in the group account ($\$8 - \text{your investment}$), plus your earnings from investments in the group account. Earnings from the group account depend on the number of dollars you and the three other members of your group invest in the group account.

Description of the earnings you and the other group members receive from investments in the group account.

Dollars to invest in group account

Results Screen

After everyone has made an investment decision you will see a results screen. The results screen will indicate the investments made by you and the other group members and will summarize the earnings you and the other group members receive if part 1 counts for payment.

Instructions Part 2

Part 2 is very similar to part 1. The only difference is that you now must make investment decisions over a sequence of ten rounds. At the beginning of each round you will be randomly matched with three other people to form a new group of four. You will never be matched with the same three people twice in a row. It is also unlikely that you will meet the same set of three other group members twice. You will not get to know who the other members of your group are nor will you be informed of their past investment. Likewise, no one will know who you are and what investments you made in the past.

Just as for part 1 you will be presented with a decision screen, which reports the earnings that you and the other group members get from investing in the group account. The decision screen will be the same in each round. That is, the earnings are the same for each of the ten rounds and are identical to those seen in part 1.

After each round is complete you will be shown a result screen which reports the investments made by you and the other group members in that round, as well as the earnings you and the other group members made in that round.

If part 2 is selected for payment we will randomly select a number between one and ten. The earnings for the corresponding round will be paid to the participants along with the \$6 show up fee. The part that counts for payment will be determined by the flip of a coin. The round that counts in part 2 will be determined by having a participant draw a number between 1 and 10.

B. Payoff tables

Table B1. Payoff table Low treatment

Average investment made by the other group members

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Y o u r I n v e s t m e n t	0	10.00 10.00	10.75 11.95	11.50 13.90	12.25 15.85	13.00 16.10	13.75 16.35	14.50 16.60	15.25 16.85	16.00 16.85	16.75 16.85	17.50 14.10	
	1	11.45 10.25	12.20 12.20	12.95 14.15	13.70 16.10	14.45 16.35	15.20 16.60	15.95 16.85	16.70 17.10	17.45 17.10	18.20 17.10	18.95 14.35	
	2	12.90 10.50	13.65 12.45	14.40 14.40	15.15 16.35	15.90 16.60	16.65 16.85	17.40 17.10	18.15 17.35	18.90 17.35	19.65 17.35	20.40 14.60	
	3	14.35 10.75	15.10 12.70	15.85 14.65	16.60 16.60	17.35 16.85	18.10 17.10	18.85 17.35	19.60 17.60	20.35 17.60	21.10 17.60	21.85 14.85	
	4	14.10 11.00	14.85 12.95	15.60 14.90	16.35 16.85	17.10 17.10	17.85 17.35	18.60 17.60	19.35 17.85	20.10 17.85	20.85 17.85	21.60 15.10	
	5	13.85 11.25	14.60 13.20	15.35 15.15	16.10 17.10	16.85 17.35	17.60 17.60	18.35 17.85	19.10 18.10	19.85 18.10	20.60 18.10	21.35 15.35	
	6	13.60 11.50	14.35 13.45	15.10 15.40	15.85 17.35	16.60 17.60	17.35 17.85	18.10 18.10	18.85 18.35	19.60 18.35	20.35 18.35	21.10 15.60	
	7	13.35 11.75	14.10 13.70	14.85 15.65	15.60 17.60	16.35 17.85	17.10 18.10	17.85 18.35	18.60 18.60	19.35 18.60	20.10 18.60	20.85 15.85	
	8	12.85 12.00	13.60 13.95	14.35 15.90	15.10 17.85	15.85 18.10	16.60 18.35	17.35 18.60	18.10 18.85	18.85 18.85	19.60 18.85	20.35 18.85	21.10 16.10
	9	12.35 12.25	13.10 14.20	13.85 16.15	14.60 18.10	15.35 18.35	16.10 18.60	16.85 18.85	17.60 19.10	18.35 19.10	19.10 19.10	19.85 19.10	20.60 16.35
	10	9.10 12.50	9.85 14.45	10.60 16.40	11.35 18.35	12.10 18.60	12.85 18.85	13.60 19.10	14.35 19.35	15.10 19.35	15.85 19.35	16.60 19.35	17.40 16.60

The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number on the right is the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed.

Table B2. Payoff table High treatment

Average investment made by the other group members

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Y o u r I n v e s t m e n t	0	10.00 10.00	10.75 10.62	11.50 11.23	12.25 11.85	13.00 12.60	13.75 13.35	14.50 14.10	15.25 14.85	16.00 14.85	16.75 14.85	17.50 14.10
	1	10.12 10.25	10.87 10.87	11.62 11.48	12.37 12.10	13.12 12.85	13.87 13.60	14.62 14.35	15.37 15.10	16.12 15.10	16.87 15.10	17.62 14.35
	2	10.23 10.50	10.98 11.12	11.73 11.73	12.48 12.35	13.23 13.10	13.98 13.85	14.73 14.60	15.48 15.35	16.23 15.35	16.98 15.35	17.73 14.60
	3	10.35 10.75	11.10 11.37	11.85 11.98	12.60 12.60	13.35 13.35	14.10 14.10	14.85 14.85	15.60 15.60	16.35 15.60	17.10 15.60	17.85 14.85
	4	10.60 11.00	11.35 11.62	12.10 12.23	12.85 12.85	13.60 13.60	14.35 14.35	15.10 15.10	15.85 15.85	16.60 15.85	17.35 15.85	18.10 15.10
	5	10.85 11.25	11.60 11.87	12.35 12.48	13.10 13.10	13.85 13.85	14.60 14.60	15.35 15.35	16.10 16.10	16.85 16.10	17.60 16.10	18.35 15.35
	6	11.10 11.50	11.85 12.12	12.60 12.73	13.35 13.35	14.10 14.10	14.85 14.85	15.60 15.60	16.35 16.35	17.10 16.35	17.85 16.35	18.60 15.60
	7	11.35 11.75	12.10 12.37	12.85 12.98	13.60 13.60	14.35 14.35	15.10 15.10	15.85 15.85	16.60 16.60	17.35 16.60	18.10 16.60	18.85 15.85
	8	10.85 12.00	11.60 12.62	12.35 13.23	13.10 13.85	13.85 14.60	14.60 15.35	15.35 16.10	16.10 16.85	16.85 16.85	17.60 16.85	18.35 16.10
	9	10.35 12.25	11.10 12.87	11.85 13.48	12.60 14.10	13.35 14.85	14.10 15.60	14.85 16.35	15.60 17.10	16.35 17.10	17.10 17.10	17.85 16.35
	10	9.10 12.50	9.85 13.12	10.60 13.73	11.35 14.35	12.10 15.10	12.85 15.85	13.60 16.60	14.35 17.35	15.10 17.35	15.85 17.35	16.60 16.60

The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number on the right is the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed.

Table B3 Payoff table Mod-Low treatment

Average investment made by the other group members

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Y o u r I n v e s t m e n t	0	10.00 10.00	10.75 11.95	11.50 13.90	12.25 15.85	13.00 16.10	13.75 16.35	14.50 16.60	15.25 16.85	16.00 16.85	16.75 16.85	16.30 14.30
	1	11.45 10.25	12.20 12.20	12.95 14.15	13.70 16.10	14.45 16.35	15.20 16.60	15.95 16.85	16.70 17.10	17.45 17.10	18.20 17.10	17.75 14.55
	2	12.90 10.50	13.65 12.45	14.40 14.40	15.15 16.35	15.90 16.60	16.65 16.85	17.40 17.10	18.15 17.35	18.90 17.35	19.65 17.35	19.20 14.80
	3	14.35 10.75	15.10 12.70	15.85 14.65	16.60 16.60	17.35 16.85	18.10 17.10	18.85 17.35	19.60 17.60	20.35 17.60	21.10 17.60	20.65 15.05
	4	14.10 11.00	14.85 12.95	15.60 14.90	16.35 16.85	17.10 17.10	17.85 17.35	18.60 17.60	19.35 17.85	20.10 17.85	20.85 17.85	20.40 15.30
	5	13.85 11.25	14.60 13.20	15.35 15.15	16.10 17.10	16.85 17.35	17.60 17.60	18.35 17.85	19.10 18.10	19.85 18.10	20.60 18.10	20.15 15.55
	6	13.60 11.50	14.35 13.45	15.10 15.40	15.85 17.35	16.60 17.60	17.35 17.85	18.10 18.10	18.85 18.35	19.60 18.35	20.35 18.35	19.90 15.80
	7	13.35 11.75	14.10 13.70	14.85 15.65	15.60 17.60	16.35 17.85	17.10 18.10	17.85 18.35	18.60 18.60	19.35 18.60	20.10 18.60	19.65 16.05
	8	12.85 12.00	13.60 13.95	14.35 15.90	15.10 17.85	15.85 18.10	16.60 18.35	17.35 18.60	18.10 18.85	18.85 18.85	19.60 18.85	19.15 16.30
	9	12.35 12.25	13.10 14.20	13.85 16.15	14.60 18.10	15.35 18.35	16.10 18.60	16.85 18.85	17.60 19.10	18.35 19.10	19.10 19.10	18.65 16.55
	10	10.10 12.10	10.85 14.05	11.60 16.00	12.35 17.95	13.10 18.20	13.85 18.45	14.60 18.70	15.35 18.95	16.10 18.95	16.85 18.95	16.40 16.40

The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number on the right is the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed.

Table B4. Payoff table Mod-High treatment

Average investment made by the other group members

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Your Investment	0	10.00 10.00	10.75 10.62	11.50 11.23	12.25 11.85	13.00 12.60	13.75 13.35	14.50 14.10	15.25 14.85	16.00 14.85	16.75 14.85	16.30 14.30
	1	10.12 10.25	10.87 10.87	11.62 11.48	12.37 12.10	13.12 12.85	13.87 13.60	14.62 14.35	15.37 15.10	16.12 15.10	16.87 15.10	16.42 14.55
	2	10.23 10.50	10.98 11.12	11.73 11.73	12.48 12.35	13.23 13.10	13.98 13.85	14.73 14.60	15.48 15.35	16.23 15.35	16.98 15.35	16.53 14.80
	3	10.35 10.75	11.10 11.37	11.85 11.98	12.60 12.60	13.35 13.35	14.10 14.10	14.85 14.85	15.60 15.60	16.35 15.60	17.10 15.60	16.65 15.05
	4	10.60 11.00	11.35 11.62	12.10 12.23	12.85 12.85	13.60 13.60	14.35 14.35	15.10 15.10	15.85 15.85	16.60 15.85	17.35 15.85	16.90 15.30
	5	10.85 11.25	11.60 11.87	12.35 12.48	13.10 13.10	13.85 13.85	14.60 14.60	15.35 15.35	16.10 16.10	16.85 16.10	17.60 16.10	17.15 15.55
	6	11.10 11.50	11.85 12.12	12.60 12.73	13.35 13.35	14.10 14.10	14.85 14.85	15.60 15.60	16.35 16.35	17.10 16.35	17.85 16.35	17.40 15.80
	7	11.35 11.75	12.10 12.37	12.85 12.98	13.60 13.60	14.35 14.35	15.10 15.10	15.85 15.85	16.60 16.60	17.35 16.60	18.10 16.60	17.65 16.05
	8	10.85 12.00	11.60 12.62	12.35 13.23	13.10 13.85	13.85 14.60	14.60 15.35	15.35 16.10	16.10 16.85	16.85 16.85	17.60 16.85	17.15 16.30
	9	10.35 12.25	11.10 12.87	11.85 13.48	12.60 14.10	13.35 14.85	14.10 15.60	14.85 16.35	15.60 17.10	16.35 17.10	17.10 17.10	16.65 16.55
	10	10.10 12.10	10.85 12.72	11.60 13.33	12.35 13.95	13.10 14.70	13.85 15.45	14.60 16.20	15.35 16.95	16.10 16.95	16.85 16.95	16.40 16.40

The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number on the right is the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed.

B5. Description of payoffs: VCM treatments

Low-VCM treatment:

“Every dollar invested in the group account by you or any other member of your group will secure the group a payoff of \$2 which is divided equally between you and the three other group members. Thus, for every dollar any group member invests in the group account you and each of the other group members will receive 50 cents.”

High-VCM treatment:

Same as Low-VCM treatment + “In addition, you will get a bonus of 60 cents for every dollar you personally invest in the group account.”

C. Additional tables and figures: Low and High

Figure C1. Distribution of response times by treatment, Part 1




Table C1. Tobit regression of contribution, Part 1

Dep. Var.: Contribution to group account	Treatments		
	Low (1)	High (2)	All (3)
Response time	-0.021** (0.008)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.008)
High			-0.199 (0.650)
High x response time			0.035*** (0.011)
Constant	6.190*** (0.501)	5.970*** (0.418)	6.180*** (0.481)
Total effect response time: High			0.015** (0.007)
N	80	80	160

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2. OLS regression of response time and contributions, Part 1

Dependent Variable:	Response time (seconds)			Contribution to group account		
	Low (1)	High (2)	All (3)	Low (4)	High (5)	All (6)
Response time				-0.018** (0.008)	0.011* (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)
% tutorial correct	22.121 (22.471)	30.526 (21.749)	22.121 (22.666)	-0.756 (1.607)	3.504*** (1.283)	-0.756 (1.479)
Experiments	-0.824 (0.531)	-0.948 (0.648)	-0.824 (0.536)	-0.021 (0.038)	0.003 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.035)
Econ courses	1.175 (1.375)	5.763*** (1.937)	1.175 (1.387)	-0.105 (0.098)	0.038 (0.119)	-0.105 (0.090)
Age	2.353 (3.085)	2.094 (3.272)	2.353 (3.112)	0.091 (0.220)	0.256 (0.191)	0.091 (0.203)
Female	-13.854* (7.672)	5.358 (7.916)	-13.854* (7.738)	0.034 (0.557)	0.423 (0.462)	0.034 (0.513)
High			-25.062 (89.289)			-7.571 (5.793)
High X response time						0.029*** (0.011)
High X % tutorial correct			8.404 (31.286)			4.260** (2.048)
High X experiments			-0.123 (0.836)			0.024 (0.055)
High X econ courses			4.588* (2.369)			0.143 (0.160)
High X age			-0.259 (4.495)			0.165 (0.292)
High X female			19.212* (11.022)			0.389 (0.724)
Constant	-2.218 (63.195)	-27.280 (63.058)	-2.218 (63.744)	5.234 (4.490)	-2.337 (3.676)	5.234 (4.133)
N	80	80	160	80	80	160

Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table C3. OLS regression of contributions on response time, outliers excluded Part 1

Dependent Variable:	Low		High		All	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Response time	-0.020**	-0.020**	0.023**	0.016	-0.020**	-0.020**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
High					-0.536	-7.296
					(0.704)	(5.925)
High X response time					0.043***	0.036**
					(0.013)	(0.014)
% tutorial correct		-0.726		3.378**		-0.726
		(1.631)		(1.301)		(1.496)
Experiments		-0.026		0.004		-0.026
		(0.040)		(0.038)		(0.036)
Econ courses		-0.120		0.038		-0.120
		(0.102)		(0.120)		(0.094)
Age		0.114		0.251		0.114
		(0.228)		(0.192)		(0.210)
Female		0.030		0.479		0.030
		(0.564)		(0.471)		(0.517)
High X % tutorial correct						4.104*
						(2.078)
High X experiments						0.030
						(0.056)
High X econ courses						0.158
						(0.162)
High X age						0.138
						(0.298)
High X female						0.449
						(0.735)
Constant	6.070***	4.917	5.534***	-2.379	6.070***	4.917
	(0.524)	(4.673)	(0.469)	(3.690)	(0.492)	(4.287)
N	78	78	79	79	157	157

Note: Choices made in more than 150 seconds excluded from the sample. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
 * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

D. Additional tables and figures: Mod-Low and Mod-High

Figure D1. Distribution of response times by modified treatment, Part 1






Figure D2. Histogram of contributions by modified treatment, Part 1



Note: Fast indicates that choices were made in less than the median response time (36.5 seconds).

Figure D3. Scatterplot of contributions and response time by modified treatment, Part 1



Note: The solid vertical line indicates the location of the Nash contribution, the dashed vertical line indicates the location of the group payoff maximizing contribution, and the horizontal solid line indicates the median response time (36.5 seconds).

Table D1. Contributions by modified treatment, Part 1

Choices	Treatment					
	Mod-Low		Mod-High		All	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
	obs.	fast	obs.	fast	obs.	fast
Mistakes below dominant strategy	1	0.00	18	66.67	19	63.16
Nash equilibrium	8	0.00	11	18.18	19	10.53
Above Nash and below group payoff max.	24	58.33	2	50.00	26	57.69
Group payoff maximizing	3	33.33	3	66.67	6	50.00
Mistakes with full provision	4	75.00	6	83.33	10	80.00
All mistakes	5	60.00	24	70.83	29	68.97
Midpoint of strategy space	8	62.50	5	60.00	13	61.54
All	40	45.00	40	55.00	80	50.00

Note: Fast indicates that choices were made in less than the median response time (36.5 seconds).

E. Screen shots: Time limit

Figure E1. Time-limit information screen

a) Time pressure

You must finalize your decision in less than 35 seconds!

If you do not finalize your decision within this time limit your earnings for this part will be **\$0.00** and your investment in the group account will be **\$0.00**.

A timer will indicate the remaining time. Once **35 seconds** have passed the decision screen will disappear.

b) Time delay

You must wait for at least 35 seconds before you finalize your decision!

A timer will indicate the remaining waiting time. Once **35 seconds** have passed you can finalize your decision.

Figure E2. Time-limit decision screen

a) Time pressure

Decision Screen

Remaining time (seconds): 19

You must finalize your decision in less than 35 seconds!

Dollars to invest in group account

Average investment made by the other group members

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
\$11.95	\$11.50 \$13.90	\$12.25 \$15.85	\$13.00 \$16.10	\$13.75 \$16.35	\$14.50 \$16.60	\$15.25 \$16.85	\$16.00 \$16.85	\$16.75 \$16.85	\$16.30 \$14.30
\$12.20	\$12.95 \$14.15	\$13.70 \$16.10	\$14.45 \$16.35	\$15.20 \$16.60	\$15.95 \$16.85	\$16.70 \$17.10	\$17.45 \$17.10	\$18.20 \$17.10	\$17.75 \$14.55
\$12.45	\$14.40 \$14.40	\$15.15 \$16.35	\$15.90 \$16.60	\$16.65 \$16.85	\$17.40 \$17.10	\$18.15 \$17.35	\$18.90 \$17.35	\$19.65 \$17.35	\$19.20 \$14.80
\$12.70	\$15.85 \$14.65	\$16.60 \$16.60	\$17.35 \$16.85	\$18.10 \$17.10	\$18.85 \$17.35	\$19.60 \$17.60	\$20.35 \$17.60	\$21.10 \$17.60	\$20.65 \$15.05
\$15.60	\$15.60	\$16.35	\$17.10	\$17.85	\$18.60	\$19.35	\$20.10	\$20.85	\$20.40

b) Time delay

Decision Screen

Remaining waiting time (seconds): 23

You must wait for at least 35 seconds before you finalize your decision!

Dollars to invest in group account

Average investment made by the other group members

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
\$11.95	\$11.50 \$13.90	\$12.25 \$15.85	\$13.00 \$16.10	\$13.75 \$16.35	\$14.50 \$16.60	\$15.25 \$16.85	\$16.00 \$16.85	\$16.75 \$16.85	\$16.30 \$14.30
\$12.20	\$12.95 \$14.15	\$13.70 \$16.10	\$14.45 \$16.35	\$15.20 \$16.60	\$15.95 \$16.85	\$16.70 \$17.10	\$17.45 \$17.10	\$18.20 \$17.10	\$17.75 \$14.55
\$12.45	\$14.40 \$14.40	\$15.15 \$16.35	\$15.90 \$16.60	\$16.65 \$16.85	\$17.40 \$17.10	\$18.15 \$17.35	\$18.90 \$17.35	\$19.65 \$17.35	\$19.20 \$14.80
\$12.70	\$15.85 \$14.65	\$16.60 \$16.60	\$17.35 \$16.85	\$18.10 \$17.10	\$18.85 \$17.35	\$19.60 \$17.60	\$20.35 \$17.60	\$21.10 \$17.60	\$20.65 \$15.05
\$15.60	\$15.60	\$16.35	\$17.10	\$17.85	\$18.60	\$19.35	\$20.10	\$20.85	\$20.40

F. Additional tables and figures: Time limit

Figure F1. Distribution of response times by modified treatment, Part 1
(Pooled time pressure and time delay)




Figure F2. Histogram of contributions by modified treatment, Part 1
(Pooled time pressure and time delay)





Figure F3. Scatterplot of contributions and response time by modified treatment, Part 1



Note: The solid vertical line indicates the location of the Nash contribution, the dashed vertical line indicates the location of the group payoff maximizing contribution, and the horizontal solid line indicates the time limit (35 seconds). The 5 observations that did not obey the time limit are missing from the scatterplot, because they do not have an associated response time.


Table F1. Contributions by modified treatment, Part 1

Choices	Treatment					
	Mod-Low		Mod-High		All	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
	obs.	fast	obs.	fast	obs.	fast
Mistakes below dominant strategy	5	60.00	34	73.53	39	71.79
Nash equilibrium	13	38.46	21	33.33	34	35.29
Above Nash and below group payoff max.	48	50.00	7	14.29	55	45.45
Group payoff maximizing	5	20.00	7	28.57	12	25.00
Mistakes with full provision	9	77.78	11	45.45	20	60.00
All mistakes	14	71.43	45	66.67	59	67.80
Midpoint of strategy space	18	0.50	13	76.92	31	61.29
All	80	50.00	80	50.00	160	50.00

Note: Fast indicates that choices were made under time pressure (in less than 35 seconds).

G. Additional tables and figures: Part 2

Figure G1. Mean contribution in Part 2 by response time in Part 1 and treatment



Note: Fast in P1 indicates that Part-1 decisions were made in less than the median response time in the treatments without a time limit, and under time pressure in the treatments with a time limit.

Table G1. OLS regression of contribution in Parts 1 and 2 by response time in Part 1 and treatment

	Low			High		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Fast	0.307* (0.078)	0.255* (0.086)	0.651** (0.026)	-0.538** (0.016)	-0.432** (0.036)	-0.562 (0.104)
Period	-0.148*** (0.004)	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.085 (0.112)	-0.006 (0.732)	-0.027 (0.108)	-0.039*** (0.004)
Mean contribution others		0.026 (0.340)	0.017 (0.696)		0.122 (0.292)	0.121 (0.300)
Fast X period			-0.072* (0.078)			0.024 (0.500)
Modified treatment	0.359 (0.248)	0.331 (0.300)	0.335 (0.276)	-0.021 (0.932)	-0.015 (0.932)	-0.015 (0.932)
Time-limit treatment	0.621** (0.020)	0.607** (0.020)	0.613*** (0.008)	0.316 (0.280)	0.317 (0.236)	0.317 (0.236)
Constant	4.551*** (0.000)	4.279*** (0.000)	4.127*** (0.000)	6.981*** (0.000)	6.252*** (0.000)	6.321*** (0.000)
N	2200	2000	2000	2200	2000	2000

Note: Wild bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the session level test the null hypotheses that the coefficient of fast and fast X period equal 0. P-values shown in parentheses. Fast indicates that decisions were made in less than the median response time in the original and modified treatments, and under time pressure in the time-limit treatments. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001.

H. Additional tables and figures: Low-VCM and High-VCM

Figure H1. Distribution of response times by VCM treatment, Part 1





Figure H2. Scatterplot of contributions and response time by VCM treatment, Part 1



Note: The solid vertical line indicates the location of the Nash contribution, the dashed vertical line indicates the location of the group payoff maximizing contribution, and the horizontal solid line indicates the median response time (35.5 seconds).

Table H1. Contributions by VCM treatment, Part 1

Choices	Treatment					
	Low-VCM		High-VCM		All VCM	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
	obs.	fast	obs.	fast	obs.	fast
Mistakes below dominant strategy	n.a.	n.a.	27	70.00	27	70.00
Nash equilibrium	8	38.00	9	22.00	17	29.00
Above Nash & below group payoff max.	24	46.00	n.a.	n.a.	24	46.00
Group payoff maximizing	8	38.00	9	22.00	17	29.00
Midpoint of strategy space	6	67.00	7	71.00	13	69.00
All	40	43.00	36	58.00	76	50.00

Note: Fast indicates that choices were made in less than the median response time (35.5 seconds).